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Abstract
This paper introduces the generalization of Mignotte modular secret sharing over the polynomial rings.
Mignotte proposed threshold secret sharing over the ring of integers. We extend his method for the ring of
polynomials which is Euclidean as well and therefore allowing to use the Chinese Remainder Theorem. In
particular, we prove that any access structure can be realized within this modular approach. Further, we
put the bounds on the number of participants of such secret sharing scheme with the moduli of the same
degree. And ﬁnally we estimate the information rate of the new scheme.
Keywords: Access structure, Chinese Remainder Theorem, co-prime polynomials, Euclidean ring,
Mignotte secret sharing, modular secret sharing, shares, threshold.
1 Introduction
The concept of secret sharing as a mathematical method of splitting the secret value
into shares so that only authorized subsets of shares could restore it was initially
introduced by Shamir [8]. Later, Asmuth, Bloom [1] and Mignotte [6] independently
devised the modular approach in secret sharing based on the Chinese Remainder
Theorem in the ring of integers. Also, Asmuth and Bloom proposed to use Euclidean
rings other than the ring of integers. All mentioned methods deal with the threshold
secret sharing i.e. all subsets of not less than k participants out of t can compute
the secret.
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Recently, it was noticed that some other access structures diﬀerent from the
threshold ones can be realized modularly by means of so called generalized Mignotte
sequences introduced by Iftene [4]. In particular, he proposed the modular realiza-
tion for so called compartmented secret sharing.
In this paper we present Mignotte secret sharing over the polynomial ring Fq[x]
where Fq is the Galois ﬁeld of prime order q. We show that it can be used to
realize any given access structure. In fact, we construct the corresponding Mignotte
sequence. Further, we consider Mignotte sequences of polynomials of equal degrees
being the closest possible moduli. This property is substantial for the secret sharing
(see, for example, [3]). We put the upper bound on the length of such sequence i.e.
the number of participants of secret sharing scheme with the equal moduli.
And ﬁnally, we estimate the information rate of the new secret sharing scheme
in the most important case of q = 2.
2 Polynomial Modular Realization of the General Ac-
cess Structures
Mignotte introduced his method for the threshold secret sharing. Let us give some
more general deﬁnitions. Let P = {x1, x2, ..., xt} be a set of participants of the
secret sharing scheme. We say that A ⊂ P is authorized if participants from A
can compute the secret. Let Γ be a set of all authorized subsets in P . Also, let
Γ be monotone that is A ∈ Γ, A ⊂ B ⇒ B ∈ Γ. Then we say that Γ is an
access structure over P . In particular, threshold access structure is deﬁned by
Γ = {B ⊂ P ||B| ≥ k}. The compartmented access structure realized modularly
by Iftene is Γ = {A ⊂ P ||A| ≥ K, |A ∩ Cj| ≥ kj , j = 1,m} where K is the global
threshold, C1, C2, ..., Cm is the partition of P into compartments and k1, k2, ..., km
is the set of corresponding compartment thresholds.
The base of the modular secret sharing is the Chinese Remainder Theorem over
Z which holds true over Fq[x] as well. Thus, we can construct the similar Mignotte
scheme for the polynomials. It is well-known that if the system of congruences
S(x) ≡ s1(x)(mod m1(x)), ..., S(x) ≡ sk(x)(mod mk(x))
over Fq[x] is solvable then it has the single solution modulo LCM(m1(x), ...,mk(x)).
As a rule the residue class representative of minimal degree is chosen for such
solution.
Now let every participant xi ∈ P possess some monic polynomial mi(x) ∈ Fq[x].
We denote the least common multiple of the moduli mi(x) for the arbitrary subset
A ∈ P as [mi(x); i ∈ A]. Let the degree of secret S(x) be chosen from some interval
(M1,M2), M1 < degS(x) < M2 where M1,M2 ∈ N and the shares si(x) are deﬁned
by si(x) ≡ S(x)(modmi(x)).
Deﬁnition 2.1 We say that access structure Γ has Mignotte realization over the
ring Fq[x] if there exist polynomials mi(x), i = 1, t such that
deg [mi, i ∈ A] > M2 for A ∈ Γ, deg [mi, i ∈ A] < M1 for A /∈ Γ(1)
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We also say that the sequence of polynomials mi(x) is a generalized polynomial
Mignotte sequence for the access structure Γ.
This deﬁnition generalizes Mignotte’s one which was introduced only for the
threshold access structures and pairwise co-prime moduli [6] and extends the deﬁ-
nition of generalized Mignotte sequences of integers introduced by Iftene [4].
It is evident that under the given conditions any authorized subset A ∈ Γ can
compute the secret solving the system of congruences S(x) ≡ si(x)( mod mi(x)), i ∈
A as well as any other subset cannot.
Theorem 2.2 Any arbitrary access structure possesses Mignotte modular realiza-
tion over the ring Fq[x].
Proof. Let us initially choose the polynomials m1(x),m2(x), ...,mt(x) equal to 1.
Now we shall consider some maximal unauthorized subset A /∈ Γ (with respect to
the inclusion i.e. such subset that no other unauthorized subset contains it). All
moduli not belonging to participants from A we multiply by some irreducible monic
p1(x) ∈ Fq[x]. As we can choose p1(x) of any degree then after multiplying we can
obtain the following condition fulﬁlled: deg [mi(x), i ∈ A] < deg [mi(x), i ∈ B], for
any authorized subset B. This condition holds true if we choose some other maxi-
mal unauthorized subset and perform the same operation for the irreducible monic
p2(x) = p1(x). Thus, having repeated the operation for all maximal unauthorized
subsets we ﬁnally derive the realization of the given access structure Γ.
To conclude the proof it remains to choose the secret S(x) so that M1 ≤
degS(x) < M2 where M1 is the maximal degree of LCM of the moduli belong-
ing to unauthorized subsets and M2 is the minimal degree of LCM of the moduli
belonging to authorized subsets.

We note that it is more convenient to use the pairwise co-prime polynomials
instead of irreducible ones. In the most cases the degrees of the resulting polynomials
in 2.2 are less for the co-prime polynomials.
3 Generalized Mignotte Sequences in the Ring Fq[x]
We shall now show that using the ring Fq[x] allows us to construct Mignotte se-
quences with better opportunities. In this ring we may choose moduli of the same
degree i.e. ones with equal Euclidean norms. The only condition is that moduli
should be co-prime.
Remark 3.1 Let m1(x),m2(x), ...,mt(x) be the set of pairwise co-prime polynomi-
als of the same degree n. It can be easily veriﬁed that this set is a Mignotte sequence
realizing all threshold access structures of t participants: (1, t), (2, t), ..., (t, t). The
value of threshold depends upon the degree of the secret. In fact, the degree se-
cret can be chosen from any numeric interval: (n, 2n), (2n, 3n), ..., ((t − 1)n, tn).
Moreover, this set of polynomials can be used for the generation of the generalized
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Mignotte sequence for any access structure with no more than t maximal unautho-
rized subsets.
Irreducible polynomials are obviously co-prime. Let the number of monic ir-
reducible polynomials of degree n in Fq[x] be Nq(n). The well-known formula for
Nq(n) is
Nq(n) =
1
n
∑
d|n
μ(d)q
n
d(2)
where μ(d) is a Mo¨bius function [5]. Let us denote the maximal number of monic
pairwise co-prime polynomials from Fq[x] of the ﬁxed degree n by Cq(n). We shall
now evaluate the value of Cq(n) but ﬁrst we need a technical result. We can not
give a reference to the following lemma so we give a proof of it.
Lemma 3.2 The function Nq(n) is strictly increasing on n for any natural q and
n except for the cases q = 2, 3 when it is strictly increasing starting from n = 2.
Proof. It follows from (2) that
Nq(n) ≥
1
n
(qn −
qn − q
q − 1
), Nq(n) ≤
1
n
(qn +
qn − q
q − 1
)
Therefore
Nq(n + 1)−Nq(n) ≥
1
n(n + 1)(q − 1)
(qn+1(nq − 3n− 1) + (2n + 1)q) > 0
for every q > 3 as nq > 3n − 1. The rest cases need more precise estimations for
Nq(n):
Nq(n) ≥
1
n
(qn −
q[
n
2
]+1 − q
q − 1
), Nq(n) ≤
1
n
(qn +
q[
n
2
]+1 − q
q − 1
)
If q = 2 then
N2(n + 1)−N2(n) ≥
1
n(n + 1)
((n− 1)2n − n2[
n+1
2
]+1 − (n + 1)2[
n
2
]+1 + 2n + 2) > 0
starting from n = 5. For 1 < n < 5 the formula also holds true, it can be veriﬁed
by the simple evaluation. The case of q = 3 is similar. 
Lemma 3.3 For any natural n
Cq(n) =
[n
2
]∑
i=1
Nq(i) + Nq(n).(3)
Proof. Any polynomial of degree n contains irreducible divisor of degree less than
or equal to [n2 ]. So Cq(n) does not exceed the sum (3). Now we consider any re-
ducible polynomial from the above set f1(x)f2(x). As deg f1(x)f2(x) = n, deg f1(x) =
l < [n2 ] then deg f2(x) = n − l. The existence of the additional polynomial f2(x)
follows from the condition Nq(l) ≤ Nq(n−l) (true for l < n−l as it obviously follows
from the lemma (3.2)). So the upper boundary on the number of polynomials is
accessible in this case. 
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Theorem 3.4 Let the polynomials used for the generalized Mignotte sequence gen-
eration possess the same degree n. Then this sequence allows to construct the mod-
ular Mignotte realization in Fq[x] of any (k, t)-threshold access structure where
t ≤ Cq(n).
Also, this sequence allows to construct the modular Mignotte realization in Fq[x] of
any general access structure over the set of t participants where
t ≤ log2Cq(n).
Proof. The boundary on the number of participants of the threshold secret sharing
scheme follows from the previous lemma. To realize the arbitrary structure accord-
ing to the theorem (2.2) we need no more than 2t diﬀerent pairwise co-prime moduli
for multiplications (number of all subsets of t participants). 
And ﬁnally let us estimate the information rate of the constructed secret sharing
scheme. Information rate is deﬁned as the quotient of dividing the length of the
secret by the maximal length of the share (in bits).We consider the most important
case of q = 2.
Theorem 3.5 The information rate of any polynomial Mignotte secret sharing
scheme over F2[x] exceeds 1/2.
Proof. Let the degrees of Mignotte’s sequence polynomials be n. The maximal
degree of the LCM of polynomials belonging to unauthorized subset is kn where k
is the corresponding number of multiplications for the moduli of the given subset.
Therefore the degree of the secret is chosen from the interval [kn, (k + 1)n]. The
degrees of shares do not exceed kn. The estimation of the information rate ρ is:
ρ =
kn
log2 (2
kn+n − 2kn)
>
kn
log2 (2
kn2n)
=
kn
kn + n
>
1
2
, k, n ∈ N

Another well-known secret sharing scheme for the general access structures based
on the monotone circuit construction was devised by Benaloh and Leichter [2]. It
has the same estimation of the lower boundary on the information rate as it was
shown in [9]. We do not investigate perfectness of the constructed Mignotte’s secret
sharing scheme in this paper. The perfectness can be measured as the quantity
of information or the logarithm of the diﬀerence between the general entropy of
the secret value and conditional one. In the case of basic Mignotte’s scheme this
estimation is not very good. However, it is possible to construct the Asmuth-Bloom
polynomial secret sharing scheme over Fq[x] i.e. choose the secret value modulo
p(x) where p(x) is an additional modulus. In this case the quantity of information
as well as the information rate can have a good estimation i.e. the scheme is close
to the perfect an ideal one. It is a common approach to use the co-prime moduli as
close as possible to achieve the best estimation of perfectness and ideality [3]. In the
case of polynomials the above estimations can be considerably improved because
we take the moduli of the equal degrees which is not possible for numbers. This
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research is a subject of our further work. In fact, we managed to conclude this
research after the conference. We have proved that the polynomial modular scheme
is perfect and ideal using the technique of Quisquater, Preneel and Vanderwalle [7].
These authors revisited the security of the modular scheme in the ring of integers
and showed that it is only asymptotically secure.
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